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Studies of EU trade policymaking often suggest that delegation of trade authority 
from the national to the European level strengthened the autonomy of public actors in 
formulating trade policies. Little empirical research, however, has been undertaken to 
corroborate this contention. To improve on this situation, I carry out two case studies 
of the EU’s participation in the multilateral trade negotiations known as the Kennedy 
Round (1964-67) and the Doha Development Agenda (2001 onwards). The analysis 
reveals that in both cases the EU’s negotiating position was largely in line with the 
demands voiced by economic interests. Although this finding is no proof of economic 
interests actually determining EU trade policies, it casts some doubt on the autonomy 
thesis. I also discuss some factors that indicate that interest group influence may be 
the most plausible explanation for the finding.
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Introduction
Which role do economic interests play in the making of European Union (EU) trade 
policy? Some current research dealing with this question suggests that policymakers 
are relatively insulated from societal pressures and thus can implement trade policies 
in line with their economic beliefs or other preferences. The argument is that the 
transfer of policy authority to the European level, by increasing economic interests’
uncertainty about who decides and what is decided, enhanced the autonomy of public 
actors in shaping EU trade policies. As many authors propose that this effect was 
intended  to  strengthen  the  state  vis-à-vis  society,  this  view  is  also  known  as  the 
“collusive  delegation  argument”.  The  autonomy  that  decision-makers  gained  as  a 
result of delegation allowed them to implement trade policies that further the public 
good, that is, achieve trade liberalisation, against the resistance of protectionist forces.
Little  empirical  research,  however,  has  been  undertaken  to  back  up this 
contention.  In fact, the  few studies that empirically tackle the question of interest 
group involvement in EU trade policy-making come to quite ambiguous results. To 
improve on this state of the art, I carry out two case studies of the EU’s participation 
in the Kennedy Round (1964-67) and the Doha Development Agenda (2001 onwards) 
of world trade talks. The choice of these two cases is based on the reasoning that in 
both of them the preconditions were ideal for collusive delegation to work. For the 
first  case,  this  is  so  because  domestic  interests  should  have  been  particularly 
vulnerable immediately after the creation of a multi-level system, as they should have 
found it difficult to adapt to the new institutional framework. For the second case, 
while societal actors may have been more familiar with the multi-level system, the 
extent of delegation of trade policy authority had increased as well, again creating a 
propitious situation for collusion by public actors. In both the 1960s and the early 2
2000s,  consequently,  on  at  least  some  issues  one  would  expect  to  see  that  public 
actors  overrode  opposition  from  societal  interests  when  pushing  for  trade 
liberalization.  This  expectation  is  not  borne  out  for  either  case,  however;  on  the 
contrary, the EU’s negotiation position was consistent with the demands voiced by 
both broad business associations and sectoral groups across a large number of issues. 
While this research falls short of establishing that economic interests actually 
determine EU trade policies, I suggest that some factors indicate that domestic actors
may indeed be influential in shaping them. In particular, economic interests enjoy 
excellent access to decision-makers in this policy field, which provides them with 
opportunities to influence outcomes. Economic interests active on trade policy issues 
also  consider  themselves  to  be  influential.  Finally,  explanations  not  based  on  the 
lobbying  efforts  by  economic  interests  find  it quite  difficult  to  explain the  close 
parallels between the EU’s negotiation position and societal demands. Together, these 
factors make it plausible that interest groups indeed have a substantial impact on EU 
trade policies.
The collusive delegation argument
Studies on EU trade policy often  maintain that the distribution of power between 
societal and public actors in this policy field is skewed in favour of the state. The 
delegation of trade policy authority to the EU level, which was agreed upon in the 
Rome Treaty (1957), supposedly insulated policy-makers from protectionist pressures 
(Nicolaïdis  and  Meunier  2002:  175;  Meunier  2005:  8-9;  Woolcock  2005:  247; 
Zimmermann 2005: 180). The insulating effect of delegation, according to this view,
was not unintended. On the contrary, the collusive delegation argument postulates that 
politicians  consciously  designed  the  EU’s  institutional  framework  to  minimise  the 
influence of societal interests. After gaining independence from specific economic 3
interests,  politicians  used  their  autonomy  to  cut  tariffs  in  international  trade 
negotiations, a policy that is in the public interest but runs counter to the policies 
demanded by sectoral pressure groups. Illustratively, Sophie Meunier (2005: 8) posits 
that  European  policymakers  “chose  to  centralize  trade  policymaking  in  order  to 
insulate  the  process  from  protectionist  pressures  and,  as  a  result,  promote  trade 
liberalization.”
The causal argument, which originated in studies of United States (US) trade 
policymaking (Destler 1986; for a critique see Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast 1997), 
starts with the assumption that protectionist trade interests dominate policymaking 
processes because collective action problems inhibit political action by consumers, the 
main winners from free trade. In this situation, politicians have an incentive to limit 
the  influence  of  import-competing  interests  if  they  either  are  concerned  about  the 
negative  consequences  of  protectionism  for  economic  growth  or  have  a  pro-trade 
preference for other reasons. They may hope that by delegating trade policy authority 
to  another  level  of  government  or  from  the  legislative  to  the  executive  they  can 
combat the extraction of rents by particular firms or sectors.
Several arguments exist for how delegation reduces societal actors’ control 
over trade policies, most of which explicitly or implicitly allude to an increase in
uncertainty resulting from delegation for domestic interests. In one view, delegation to 
a  higher  level  of  government  may  increase  the  free  rider  problems  of  societal
interests. The larger number of actors benefiting from specific  policies in a larger 
geographical  district  could  exacerbate  collective  action  problems,  and  thus  keep 
societal interests from influencing policy outcomes. Another prominent explanation 
draws attention to the size of electoral districts. It suggests that in political systems 
with small districts, the negative effects of pork barrel policies can be externalised to 4
other constituencies (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981). In political systems with 
large  districts,  by  contrast,  the  constituency  that  receives  the  benefits  of  specific 
policies also has to carry their costs (Rogowski 1987). A move from small to large 
districts consequently makes sure that the losers from protectionist policies are to be 
found in the same districts as the winners. Such a situation may enhance decision-
makers’ ability to find  alternative support coalitions, making it easier  for them to 
ignore protectionist special interests (McKeown 1999: 30, FN 10).
Delegation to an intergovernmental forum as happened in the EU may have 
other important effects. It provides governments with control over the agenda, alters 
decision-making  procedures,  creates  or  makes  more  pronounced  information 
asymmetries that favour the government, and provides governments with additional 
ways  to  justify  their  policy  choices  (Moravcsik  1994).  All  of  these  factors  can 
strengthen  the  state  vis-à-vis  societal  interests.  In  addition,  intergovernmental 
cooperation  in  a  policy  field  may  enhance  governments’  bargaining  power  in 
domestic  negotiations  by  allowing  them  to  refer  to  international  constraints  that 
impede  their  giving  in  to  societal  demands  (Grande  1996).  Whatever  the  specific 
causal chain suggested in a study, all of these explanations concur in the prediction of 
greater autonomy by public actors in the aftermath of delegation of trade authority 
from the national to the European level.
Given  the  prominence  of  the  state  autonomy  claim  in  the  literature,  it  is 
astonishing to see how little empirical research has been carried out to actually test the
hypothesis for the case of EU trade policies. A few case studies provide the only 
empirical evidence of interest group influence on EU trade policy choices currently 
available. One such analysis shows that the EU decided to start a dispute settlement 
case  in  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  against  American  tax  refunds  for 5
exporters based on only casual business consultation. It concludes that the “relative 
autonomy enjoyed by states on deciding which cases to bring and pursue does not 
support the more extreme arguments that governments are mere messengers at the 
WTO  for  corporate  preferences”  (Hocking  and  McGuire  2002:  466).  The  study, 
however, does not provide (and in fact does not claim to provide) evidence in support 
of  the  collusive  delegation  hypothesis.  Little  may  indicate  that  business  interests 
actually pushed the European Commission to become active in this case (although 
Airbus Industries most likely did exert some pressure). Neither, however, was there 
strong opposition to the launching of the case, which member states would have had 
to overcome by way of collusive delegation. 
For  the  case  of  the  Uruguay  Round  (1986-93)  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations, some evidence suggests that the French government may not have been 
particularly responsive to the interests of French industry (Cowles 2001: 167). Again, 
however, the collusive delegation argument is little useful in explaining this finding. 
Rather, it seems that the French government’s position was heavily influenced by 
other  domestic  interests,  in  particular  farmers  and  audiovisual  services  providers
(Devuyst 1995; Keeler 1996). Once French industry became more insistent on the 
need  for  a  successful  conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round,  moreover,  the  French 
government  changed  course. Still  other  studies  actually stress  the  influence  that 
economic interests can have on EU trade policy-making (van den Hoven 2002; Dür 
2004; Coen and Grant 2005; De Bièvre and Dür 2005). Empirical support for the 
collusive delegation hypothesis hence is limited.
What  is  more,  also  a  series  of  theoretical  shortcomings  cast  doubt  on  the 
collusive delegation hypothesis, at least as applied to the case of EU trade policies. 
For one, this line of reasoning is built on the assumption that politicians have a short-6
term incentive to provide protection and are relatively unconcerned with the long-term 
gains from freer trade. Why then would they move to insulate trade policymaking to 
achieve  long-term  welfare  gains  that  are  close  to  irrelevant  for  their  short-term 
electoral success? Even if politicians, in a moment of autonomy, would manage to
move decision-making to a larger geographical area, it is not obvious why politicians 
should  consistently  have  more  liberal  preferences  than  domestic  interests.  This  is 
particularly so because societal actors can also influence the selection of policymakers 
(Fordham and McKeown 2003). Moreover, for the case of supranational actors, it 
might actually be in the bureaucratic self-interest of an agent to be more protectionist 
than its principals (Frey and Buhofer 1986). The reason for this is that the agent’s 
standing should increase as it becomes the addressee of demands for protection.
More  importantly  still,  the  EU’s  institutional  framework  for  trade  policy-
making runs counter the collusive delegation argument. Following Article 113 of the 
Treaty  of  Rome  (1958),  which  governed  trade  policymaking  in  the  EU  until  the 
revisions  in  the  Treaties  of  Amsterdam  (1999)  and  Nice  (2003),  the  Council  of 
Ministers was to decide on international trade agreements unanimously for an initial 
period of eight  years. The treaty  stipulated that after this period trade  agreements 
should be ratified by qualified majority. Yet, just before this provision was to enter 
into force, France insisted on the need to maintain unanimous decisions on issues 
concerning  important  national  interests,  a  demand  that  was  accepted  by  the  other 
member states in the Luxembourg compromise of 1966. 
Later, when the Luxembourg compromise started to be whittled away in other 
policy fields, the extension of the scope of trade negotiations to new issues such as 
intellectual  property  rights,  investments  and  services,  made  sure  that  unanimity 
persisted in the trade policy field. For these issues, the original treaty provisions did 7
not assign exclusive competences to the EU and thus required unanimous decisions 
(see  also  the  discussion  in  Young  2002).  Although  the  Treaty  of  Nice  extended 
qualified majority voting to services and intellectual property rights, the situation has 
not changed fundamentally. With governments continuing to defend their right to veto
trade agreements, it is not plausible that the current Doha Development Agenda could 
be concluded against the opposition of a member state. As a result, throughout these 
decades decisions concerning trade negotiations have had to be taken unanimously.
1
The  unanimity  requirement  makes  sure  that  the  European  Commission, 
although endowed with the sole right to make proposals on trade policy matters, is 
tightly  constrained (De  Bièvre  and Dür 2005).  Interest  groups, consequently, may 
concentrate their lobbying effort on their national governments (Feld 1967: 34), and 
push them to block trade agreements that run counter to their interests. Aware of this, 
the European Commission has an incentive to listen to economic interests, rather than 
having her proposals rejected by the Council of Ministers. The resulting “symbiotic”
relationship  between  the  Commission  and  interest  groups  (Mazey  and  Richardson 
2003: 209, 212) can lead to a situation in which “companies and the Commission 
present the member states with a negotiating strategy ‘pre-approved’ by European 
industry” (Cowles 2001: 171).
Delegation  may  even  enhance  governments’  ability  to  give  in  to  special 
interests.  Loosely  applying  a  principal-agent  framework,  the  more  informed  the 
electorate is, the more difficult the government will find it to engage in actions that 
run  counter  the  preferences  of  voters.  The  loss  in  transparency  resulting  from 
delegation should inhibit voters’ monitoring of policy decisions more than any other 
interests. Less scrutiny by voters should allow politicians to impose policies that are 
1 The situation is different for administrative trade instruments such as antidumping duties and for the 
use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The main features of trade policy are, however, decided 
in international trade negotiations.8
even more in line with special interest group demands than before. Delegation may 
hence boost the power of economic interests by giving politicians more leeway from 
electoral demands. The resulting expectation is an “increasing prevalence of special 
interests over the general public interest” in the EU (Petersmann 1991: 167). In short, 
neither  existing  empirical  studies  nor  theoretical  reasoning  supports  the  collusive 
delegation argument.
Economic interests and trade policy-making in the EU
To further scrutinise the collusive delegation argument,  I compare European trade 
policy choices and interest group demands in two periods, namely the 1960s and the 
years from 1998 until 2006. In these two periods, the EU engaged in the Kennedy 
Round of world trade talks and the Doha Development Agenda respectively.
2 The 
collusive  delegation  argument  suggests  that  the  EU’s  position  in  these  trade 
negotiations should have been shaped by the preferences of decision-makers. These 
preferences,  in  turn,  are  expected  to  be  less  protectionist  than  those  of  domestic 
interests,  leading  to  the  prediction  that at  least  on  some  issues  the  EU’s  position 
should  have  diverged  from  the  demands  voiced  by  domestic  interests.  A  close 
reflection of societal demands in the EU’s negotiating position, by contrast, will cast 
doubt on the collusive delegation hypothesis.
The EU and trade liberalisation in the Kennedy Round
Shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community in 1958, the US
asked this new entity to engage in international trade negotiations with the aim of 
substantially liberalising trade flows. In particular, the US administration proposed 
2 By selecting these two cases, which are temporally relatively far apart, I can show that essentially
the same dynamics were at play at the beginning of the process of European integration and now, 
although the issues covered by the negotiations have changed substantially. I see no reason to believe 
that an analysis of the Tokyo Round (1973-79) or the Uruguay Round (1986-94) would result in a 
different finding.9
linear  tariff  cuts  by  50  percent  of  the  tariffs  of  developed  countries.  The  trade 
liberalisation that resulted from the ensuing Kennedy Round sharply contrasts with 
protectionist European trade policies in the 1950s. Was this liberalisation a result of 
the  increased  autonomy  of  public  actors  from  societal  demands,  as  postulated  by 
advocates of the collusive delegation hypothesis?
I suggest that the answer to this question is no. In fact, the available evidence 
shows that economic interests supported the EU’s trade policy stance. Exporting firms 
became politically active (Washington Post, 28 February 1963, C23), and pushed for 
reciprocal trade liberalisation, which should lead to improved market access in other 
countries. They accepted linear tariff cuts, but insisted on the elimination of tariff 
disparities between the US and the EEC (Washington Post, 4 June 1964, B5).
3 In 
practice, this meant that for goods on which the US had substantially higher tariffs 
than the EEC, the former should make more far-reaching concessions than the latter to 
achieve  a  harmonisation  of  tariff  levels.  In  line  with  these  demands,  European 
governments  called  for  the  reduction  of  high  American  tariffs  to  achieve  tariff 
harmonisation.
4 Throughout the negotiations, the EEC insisted on this point, which 
finally also found its way into the Kennedy Round agreement.
In  addition,  European  exporters  pushed  for  an  extension  of  the  scope  of 
negotiations to non-tariff barriers such as the American Selling Price (ASP), a method 
used in the US to evaluate the price of imported chemicals that inflated the tariffs that 
3 “Note.  Préparation  de  la  Conférence  Kennedy.  Opinions  des  producteurs  français.”  5  February 
1963. Archives Diplomatiques, Paris (from here : AD), Service de Coopération Economique, No. 931. 
‘Stellungnahme der deutschen Landesgruppe der Internationalen Handelskammer zu den Dokumenten 
der  IHK  Nr.  102/20  betr.  Zolldisparitäten  und  Nr.  102/21  betr.  Nichttarifäre  Handelshemmnisse’, 
January 1964. PA, B53-III-A2, No. 276.
4  ‘Aide  -  Mémoire  à  l’attention  de  M.  le  Secrétaire  Général’,  Bruxelles,  22  October  1962.  AD, 
Service de Coopération Economique, No. 930.10
had to be paid.
5 French and German economic interests also demanded that the US
accept  international  rules  for  the  use  of  its  anti-dumping  instrument.
6  The  Paris 
section  of  the  French  Chamber  of  Commerce  went  even  further  when  asking  for 
negotiations concerning domestic American legislation such as internal taxes and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, which allowed the US President to impose quotas for 
agricultural  products.
7  The  French  Federation  of  Mechanical  Industries,  moreover, 
complained about the Buy America Act, which disadvantaged European producers in 
American public procurement.
8
Again, the positions of European governments and the European Commission 
were in line with these demands. All of them pushed for an expansion of the agenda to 
non-tariff barriers (Economist, 13 April 1963, 171). For example, the French Foreign 
Ministry suggested that parallel negotiations concerning non-tariff barriers would be 
necessary.
9 Since also Germany pushed for negotiations at least on the abolition of the 
American Selling price system, it is no wonder that in its recommendations to the 
Council of Ministers the European Commission insisted that “[p]ara-tariff barriers 
should also be considered” in the negotiations.
10
Not  only  exporting  interests,  however,  were  active  in  lobbying.  Sectors
suffering from import-competition, such as the aluminium, ceramics, coal, electrical, 
5 Verband  der  chemischen  Industrie,  E.  V.,  to  Ministerialdirigent  D.  W.  Keller,  Foreign  Office, 
‘Wirtschaftspolitik im Chemiebereich 1962/63’, 29 August 1963. Politisches Archiv, Berlin (from here: 
PA), B53-III-A2, No. 283.
6  CNPF,  ‘Note.  Préparation  de  la  Conférence  Kennedy.  Opinions  des  producteurs  français’  5 
February 1964. AD, Service de Coopération Economique, No. 931. 
7 Chambre de Commerce & d’Industrie de Paris, ‘Futures négociations commerciales en application 
du Trade Expansion Act’, 9 May 1963. AD, Service de Coopération Economique, No. 930. 
8 F.I.M.T.M. ‘Négociations tarifaires C.E.E./Etats-Unis au sein du G.A.T.T.: Note complémentaire de 
la Fédération des Industries Mécaniques’, August 1963. AD, Service de Coopération Economique, No. 
949.
9 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, Service de 
Coopération Economique, ‘Note’, 19 November 1962. AD, Service de Coopération Economique, No. 
930.
10  Communauté  Economique  Européenne,  ‘Négociations  a  la  suite  du  Trade  Expansion  Act. 
Autorisation de négociations tarifaires dans le cadre du G.A.T.T.’, 26 March 1963. AD, Service de 
Coopération Economique, No. 930.11
and glass industries in Germany, and the car industry in France, were demanding 
exceptions from the linear tariff cuts agreed upon.
11 Throughout the EEC, the textile 
industry and the agricultural sector (Neunreither 1968, 371-73) were vocal in rejecting 
trade  liberalisation.  In  accordance  with  these  demands,  the  EEC  pushed  for  the 
exclusion of some 19 percent of industrial goods from the linear tariff cuts (Wall 
Street Journal, 16 November 1964, 30). On the exception list were most of those 
goods for which producers had lobbied for continued protection, such as commercial 
vehicles  and  cotton  textiles.  In  addition,  the  EEC  made  clear  that  the  agricultural 
sector would have to be largely exempted from trade liberalisation. In the Kennedy 
Round, consequently, the EEC’s negotiating position was essentially in line with the
demands voiced by economic interests. 
The EU’s push for the Doha Development Agenda
The  EU currently  engages  in  a  new  round  of  global  trade  negotiations  in  the 
framework of the WTO, known as the Doha Development Agenda. Preparations for 
this round started in the mid-1990s, with the EU in the forefront of the countries 
supporting the commencement of new multilateral negotiations. After a first attempt 
at starting this trade round failed during the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle in 
1999, WTO members finally launched the Doha Development Agenda in November 
2001. After the start of the round, however, the negotiations made only slow progress. 
The WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun in 2003, which was supposed to signal the 
mid-term of the negotiations, broke down in failure, and the negotiations could be 
brought back on track only in July 2004, with an agreement on the future negotiating 
agenda. The Hong Kong ministerial meeting in December 2005, which should have 
11  Internal  paper  in  the  German  economics  ministry,  February  1964.  PA,  B53-III-A2,  No.  290. 
Chambre Syndicale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères 
Paris, 7 July 1964. AD, Service de Coopération Economique, No. 932.12
decided upon the further negotiating modalities, again did not manage to achieve this 
aim. The negotiations were suspended for half a year in July 2006, and re-launched at 
the end of January 2007, but at the time of writing there is still no agreement in sight.
In the negotiations, the EU asked for substantial reductions of tariffs and the 
elimination of tariff peaks in industrial goods. All WTO members other than least 
developed  countries  should  agree  to  the  binding  of  100  percent  of  tariff  lines  to 
impede future increases. High on the EU’s agenda was also a further liberalisation of 
trade in services, but excluding audiovisual ones. With regard to international rules, 
the  EU  insisted  on  the  need  for  agreements  on  the  so-called  “Singapore  issues”, 
namely  trade  facilitation,  public  procurement,  competition  policy,  and  investment 
rules (EU Council 1999). Finally, with respect to agriculture, the EU was willing to 
make some concessions, but without completely abandoning the use of quotas or of 
domestic supports. In late 2005, it suggested cuts of agricultural tariffs of between 35 
and 60 percent, a widening of existing quotas, and the complete elimination of export 
subsidies. While far-reaching, these proposals would still leave most EU producers of 
agricultural goods with ample protection against foreign competition.
How  does  this  EU  position  compare  with  societal  demands?  An  analysis 
reveals that it is surprisingly close to the preferences of economic interests, often 
managing  to  bridge  conflicting  interests  among  societal  groups. For  one,  most 
European  business  interests  have  supported  the  EU’s  push  for  new,  wide-ranging
negotiations.  The  Union  of  Industrial  and  Employers’  Confederations  of  Europe 
(UNICE), for example, hoped for “comprehensive [negotiations]”, to be “concluded 
by a single agreement” (Unice 1999), a position that was echoed by the European 
Roundtable  of  Industrialists.  At  the  national  level,  practically  all  broad  employers 
associations, such as the Federation of German Industry, the Confederation of British 13
Industry,  the  Movement  of  French  Enterprises,  the  General  Federation  of  Italian 
Industry, and the Spanish Employers’ Confederation have been sympathetic to the 
EU’s position (see, for example: BDI 2002; CBI 2000; MEDEF 2004; Confindustria 
2005; CEOE 2003). Backing also has come from importers, retailers, and traders, 
represented by EuroCommerce and the Foreign Trade Association at the European 
level.
Particularly strong has been the pressure for negotiations in the services sector
(van den Hoven 2002: 20-21; Böhmer and Glania 2003: 29-32). Service providers in 
several member states, especially Great Britain, Ireland, and the Nordic states, have 
been adamant in demanding a further liberalisation of trade in services. In 1999, these 
providers  established  a  specific  organisation  at  the  European  level,  the  European 
Services Forum, with the sole purpose of defending the industry’s interests in the new 
WTO negotiations (Interview, Brussels, 10 January 2006). Ever since, the European 
Services Forum has spoken out in favour of a strengthening of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services that currently governs international trade in services (European 
Services  Forum  2003 and  2005).  The  services  negotiations  were  also  pushed  by 
industrial  producers,  who  increasingly  sell  hardware  together  with  complementary 
services. Given these societal demands, it is no wonder that the EU was the main 
advocate of a services agreement in the WTO.
Business  also  supported  an  international  agreement  on  investments,  which 
should protect foreign investments against expropriation and increase the transparency 
of national investment policies (UNICE 1999; Foreign Trade Association 2003). Only 
when witnessing the problems of the negotiators in making progress, some groups 
became  sceptical  about  the  utility  of  investment  negotiations,  arguing  that  an 
overburdened agenda could protract the negotiations for too long. At the same time, 14
the  negotiations  on  trade  facilitation  received  increasing  support,  with  European 
business  establishing  the  European  Business  Trade  Facilitation  Network  in  2001. 
Trade  facilitation  should  reduce  the  costs  of  trade  by  streamlining  customs 
procedures, and harmonising data and documentation requirements. An agreement on 
trade facilitation is a major aim of such  groups as the  Foreign Trade  Association 
(Interview, Brussels, 13 January 2006), the European Round Table of Industrialists 
(ERT 2005), the chemical industry (CEFIC 2003b), and the European Information & 
Communication Technology Industry Association (EICTA 2005).
Again,  these  demands  are  reflected  in  the  EU’s  position.  Initially,  the  EU 
asked to have the negotiations on the four Singapore issues concluded in form of a 
“single undertaking”, meaning that all countries would have to accept or reject the 
negotiation  results  as  a  package.  The  EU’s  hope  for  wide-ranging  negotiations, 
however, was disappointed at the Doha ministerial meeting in 2001, when especially 
developing countries opposed its demand for the inclusion of the Singapore issues. In 
the  WTO  ministerial  meeting  in  Cancún  (2003),  the  EU  once  more expected  to 
receive a commitment by the other negotiating parties to extend the scope of the trade
round. The agenda of the round, however, was only finalised in July 2004, when the 
EU fought to salvage the negotiations on trade facilitation, the issue which also seems
dearest to European economic interests.
Protectionist interests have become less vocal over time. Nevertheless, some 
sectors still lobby for exceptions from trade liberalisation. Prominently among them is 
the audiovisual part of the services sector. The European Broadcasting Union (1999) 
stresses  the  “democratic,  cultural  and  social  specificity  of  audio-visual  services”. 
Similarly, the European Film Industry GATS Steering Group (2002) points out that 
the EU should safeguard its current system and should not negotiate in this area. In 15
line with these demands, the EU defends an exception for the cultural and audiovisual 
sectors to preserve “cultural diversity” (EU Council 1999). A further group with an 
essentially  protectionist  position  are  the  European  automobile  producers.  They
advocate the maintenance of a tariff of 6.6 percent against foreign imports, meaning a 
reduction of the tariff by no more than one third. Once more, the EU’s position echoes
industry demands (Financial Times, 8 March 2003, 9). Finally, the EU’s defence of 
less  extensive  tariff  cuts  in  the  textile  sector mirrors  demands  for  protection  by 
producers in this industry.
Farmers  also  clearly  oppose  trade  liberalisation,  arguing  that  such 
liberalisation would undermine the viability of European small-scale farming (COPA-
COGECA  2005).  They  signal  some  willingness  to  accept  cuts  of  trade  distorting 
supports, but only if all developed countries accept the same disciplines, and if the 
result is fair rather than free trade. Recognising the fact that the EU will have to make 
concessions on agriculture to achieve its objectives in other areas of the negotiations, 
several broad business groups try to counter the lobbying effort of farmers, arguing 
that meaningful concessions in this area are necessary (CEFIC 2003a; MEDEF 2004; 
see  also  Böhmer  and  Glania  2003:  32-33).  Others  mainly  see  agriculture  as  a 
bargaining chip in the negotiations, which can be used to gain better foreign market 
access on other issues. As put by the European Services Forum (2004), if the EU does 
not get a substantial agreement on services, “WTO members cannot expect the EU to 
give much on agriculture.”
The EU’s position largely bridges these various demands. It stresses the need 
to  establish  a  “fair  and  market-oriented  agricultural  trading  system”  (EU  Council 
1999). By conceding just enough on agriculture, it hopes to induce other countries to 
accept an agreement on the issues where the EU wants to achieve foreign market 16
opening. For the outward-oriented agricultural interests, it managed to push the issue 
of protecting geographical indications onto the negotiating agenda of the round. The 
internal  reform  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  in  2003,  which  was  made 
necessary  by  financial  constraints,  allowed  the  EU  to  offer  some  concessions  on 
agriculture in the Doha round, without fearing major opposition from European farm 
groups. In 2006, however, the EU’s decision not to make further concessions with 
respect  to  agriculture,  which  was  in  accordance  with  a  strong  lobbying  effort  by 
European  agricultural  interests  (COPA  and  COGECA  2006),  contributed  to  the 
suspension of the negotiations.
Overall, therefore, the EU’s negotiating position is closely in line with interest 
group demands. Table 1 subdivides the EU’s negotiating position into 19 issues, and 
shows that on all of them the EU could build on support from concentrated economic 
interests. What is more, there is little opposition to the EU’s negotiating position from 
concentrated interests: among the few exceptions are the questions of the extent of 
agricultural  liberalization  and  whether  or  not to  open  the  trade-related  intellectual 
property  rights  package.  The  same  cannot  be  said  about nongovernmental 
organisations, which  defend such  diverse  objectives  as  environmental  protection, 
more focus on development and regard for human and labour rights. Development 
groups, for example, want a profound reform of the EU’s agricultural policies, which 
should lead to the elimination of all export subsidies and all trade distorting domestic 
subsidies (CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis 2005). Environmental groups push for the 
inclusion of environmental standards in trade agreements. 
At the level of rhetoric, the demands of these groups have been taken up in the 
EU’s negotiating position, which refers to the importance of development and the 
need  to  protect  the  environment.  Nevertheless,  on  issues  of  key  concern to17
concentrated  interests,  whether  these are  farmers  or  business  groups,  the  EU’s 
position is most often in line with the latter. Illustratively, while nongovernmental
organisations make a strong call for unilateral concessions by developed countries, the 
EU’s  position  is  in  accordance  with  economic  interests  that  argue  that  larger 
developing countries such as Brazil and India should “have a responsibility to commit 
to ambitious market opening for goods and services“ (UNICE and ESF 2005, see also 
MEDEF 2004; CEFIC 2003a: 2). This finding does not run counter to the argument 
made in this paper, however. Rather, it supports the widely held view that diffuse 
interests find it more difficult to shape policy outcomes than concentrated interests 
(see for example Dür and De Bièvre 2007).
Luck or influence?
Both cases have shown close parallels between the demands voiced by societal actors 
and the positions defended by the EU in international trade negotiations, a finding that
casts  substantial  doubt  on  the  collusive  delegation  argument.  Nevertheless,  the 
evidence  presented  so  far  does  not  allow  for  conclusions  about the  influence  of 
economic interests over trade policy outcomes. Societal preferences could coincide 
with policy outcomes by chance only (Barry 1980), although the probability of this 
being so in this case is very low  given that trade policy choices have a series of 
dimensions. I will shed some more light on this issue when discussing three factors 
that  support  the influence  rather  than  the  luck  conjecture:  economic  interests’
excellent access to decision-makers, their self-evaluation as being influential, and the 
lack of a plausible alternative explanation for the finding of close parallels between 
the EU’s negotiating position and interest group demands. Even though in this process 
I cannot present a “smoking gun” that establishes interest group influence beyond 18
doubt, I still propose that the interest group influence hypothesis accounts rather well
for the available evidence.
Access to decision-makers
In the EU, economic interests have the benefit of first-rate access to decision-makers
on trade policy issues. In the case of the Kennedy Round, archival records in France 
and Germany reveal close consultation between governments and economic interests. 
In both countries, the governments even informally surveyed all economic sectors to 
prepare  an  informed  negotiating  position.  As  a  result,  decision-makers’  level  of 
information about the preferences of economic interests was high. In the French case, 
for example, officials in the foreign ministry knew that the paper sector, which faced 
competition from Scandinavia, wanted to preserve trade barriers. They also noted, 
however, that producers of “thin paper”, which is used for cigarettes and condensers, 
were export-oriented and thus requested trade liberalisation.
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Similarly,  in  the  case  of  the  Doha  Development  Agenda,  business  enjoyed 
excellent access to decision-makers. For example, the British government, and here 
particularly the Department of Trade and Industry, has held regular meetings with all 
actors concerned with trade policy within the Trade Policy Consultative Forum. In 
Denmark, societal actors have had access to decision-makers on trade policy matters 
through  the  so-called  “Beach  Club  process”  since  1998  (OECD  2001:  37-38).  In 
addition,  the  European  Commission  directly  approached  trade  associations  to  get 
information on their preferences before drawing up its own position paper on the new 
round  in  early  1999.  Illustratively,  to  get  business  input  for  the  investment 
negotiations, the European Commission initiated an informal “Investment Network” 
in  1998  (European  Commission  1998).  In  the  framework  of  this  network,  the 
12 ‘Note. Préparation de la Conférence Kennedy. Opinions des producteurs français’ 5 February 1964. 
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Commission repeatedly met representatives of major companies in the run-up to the 
Seattle ministerial conference in 1999. The EU also commissioned a survey of 10,000 
large companies to get to know their position on the investment talks in the WTO 
(Taylor  Nelson  Sofres  Consulting  2000).  In  the  document  setting  out  the  EU’s 
position on this part of the world trade round, therefore, the European Commission 
could  cite  support  by  European  business  as  a  reason  for  its  insistence  on  an 
investment  agreement:  “The  European  business  community  has  made  clear  its 
position in favour of multilateral rules on investment” (European Commission, DG I
1999).
Later,  DG  Trade  upgraded  these  initial  informal  meetings  into  the  Civil 
Society  Dialogue,  which  regularly  brings  together  Commission  officials  and 
representatives of nongovernmental organisations and economic interests. Similarly, 
DG Agriculture organised general hearings with societal organisations before the start 
of the Doha Development Agenda (European Commission, DG VI 1999). It also has 
regular contact with societal interests through a series of advisory groups that are 
composed of representatives of agricultural producers, traders, and consumers. Both 
DGs continue having less formal meetings with the peak agricultural and business 
associations (see for example COPA and COGECA 2006). Overall, therefore, both in 
the  Kennedy  Round  and  in  the  Doha  Development  Agenda,  economic  interests 
enjoyed privileged access to decision-makers, a condition that should have facilitated 
their attempts at influencing outcomes.
Self-assessment of influence
A small survey of business and farm groups with an interest in trade policy provides 
further evidence that economic interests actually manage to influence European trade 
policies (De Bièvre and Dür 2005). We approached 100 groups, chosen randomly 20
among all groups registered in the Civil Society Dialogue database of the European 
Commission  (excluding  those  which  have  their  base  in  third  countries).
13  Our 
response rate was 47 percent, with about half of the respondents filling in the online 
questionnaire  only  after  being  called  by  phone.  The  respondents  fall  into  two 
categories:  nongovernmental  organisations  (26)  and  business  and  agricultural
constituencies (21). One of the questions posed was how these groups themselves 
evaluate the extent to which their activities affect European trade policy, with the 
possible responses being to a large extent, to some extent, not really, and not at all. Of 
the 21 organisations representing economic interests, 20 responded with “to a large
extent” or “to some extent”. Qualitative evidence also points in the same direction. 
Representatives  of  some  trade  associations  even  suggest  that  they  perceive  of  the 
European Commission as a service institution, with the task of representing European 
business  interests  in  international  trade  negotiations  (Interviews  with  EU  business 
organisations, Brussels, January 2006).
Given this self-assessment of influence, it is no wonder that economic interests 
generally tend to be quite satisfied with the EU’s negotiating position. Illustratively, 
the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce strongly welcomed the results of 
the Kennedy Round (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 May 1967, 1 and 4). More 
recently, economic interests explicitly praised the EU’s efforts to push for progress in 
the services sector in the Doha Development Agenda (UNICE and ESF 2005). The 
European  Services  Forum  (2004)  lauded  the  efforts  of  the  “Commission’s  hard-
working  negotiating  team.”  Even  agricultural  interests,  although  concerned about 
possible concessions to foreign countries, are mostly satisfied with the negotiating 
position of the EU (COPA-COGECA 2000).
13 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/search.cfm?action=form, last accessed on 18/09/2006.21
Alternative explanations of the observed pattern
It is difficult to find an alternative explanation, not based on interest group lobbying, 
for the observation of a close reflection of the demands voiced by economic interests 
in the EU’s negotiation position. One argument suggests that economic interests often 
adopt rather than influence the position of decision-makers (Yoffie and Bergenstein 
1985;  Woll  and  Artigas  2005).  If  firms  realise  that  they have  to  interact  with 
government  repeatedly,  their  rational  response  may  be to  establish  a  special 
relationship with decision-makers (Woll and Artigas 2005). By supporting the latter 
on some issues, societal actors may gain access to policymakers for issues that are 
more important to them (Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985: 131). Alternatively, groups’
need  for  public  funding  (Mahoney  2004)  may  provide  them  with  an  incentive  to 
assume positions that are welcome to decision-makers. 
While these arguments may capture part of reality, they have to assume that 
decision-makers have specific preferences concerning trade policy, independent from 
societal demands. But this just raises the question where these preferences come from. 
A  possible  response  is  that  economic  efficiency  and  an  attempt  to  boost  the 
competitiveness of the European economy were the actual driving forces behind the 
EU’s trade policy stance in both negotiations. This argument, however, is put into 
doubt  by  the  EU’s  defence  of  exceptions  for  import-sensitive  sectors  in  both 
negotiations. Import-competing sectors were politically more active in the 1960s than 
they  are  now,  but  the  EU  still  stands  up  for  the  interests  of  audiovisual  services 
providers, automobile producers, and the textile and agricultural sectors. In particular, 
the EU defends the Common Agricultural Policy although cheaper imports of food 
and an alternative usage of the funds used to support agricultural production in Europe 
would most likely boost the competitiveness of the European economy. The argument 22
positing that economic interests adopt a position that pleases public actors is also put 
into doubt by the fact that the positions defended by different firms and sectors is 
easily explained by their competitive position, that is, whether they are struggling 
with imports or able to sell on world markets. In short, alternative arguments fall short 
of fully accounting for the parallels between the EU’s negotiating position and interest 
group demands. Interest group influence remains as the most plausible explanation for 
the available evidence. 
Conclusion
Several existing accounts of the making of EU trade policies stress the relatively large 
independence  of  decision-makers  from  societal  interests.  The  argument  is  that 
delegation  of  trade  authority  from  the  national  to  the  European  level  insulated 
policymakers  from  protectionist  interests.  This  insulation,  so  the  argument  goes, 
explains the shift from protectionism to liberalisation witnessed since the 1960s, as 
policymakers could implement “good” economic policies in the absence of societal 
pressures.  I  have  countered  this  interpretation  with  empirical  evidence  on  the 
coincidence between societal demands and the EU’s position in trade negotiations in 
the Kennedy Round and the Doha Development Agenda. The two case studies show 
striking parallels between the positions defended by economic interests and public 
actors. Even in situations in which EU governments have to find issue linkages to 
come to an agreement, the resulting trade policies tend to be tailor-made to avoid the 
imposition of concentrated costs on constituencies in any member country. Although 
this correlation between demands and the EU’s negotiating position by itself does not 
allow  for  the  conclusion  of  interest  group  influence,  several  factors  suggest  that 
reference to influence is needed to explain trade policy outcomes. 23
“Collusive delegation”,  consequently, may not  be as forceful as sometimes 
claimed. Little evidence supports the view that the EU acted against the demands of 
economic interests when liberalising trade after the creation of this customs union. 
Moreover,  it  seems  that  domestic  input  into  European  trade  policies  remains 
important. In this view, the EU did not choose trade liberalisation because it is a 
“good policy”, but because societal interests, initially mainly exporters and later also 
importers and retailers, pushed for it. This is not to say that the system of interest 
group input into EU trade policies is unbiased. The policymaking process actually 
seems  to  favour  concentrated  over  diffuse  interests  (see  also  Dür  and  De  Bièvre 
2007). The latter, although increasingly vocal on European trade policy through  a 
variety  of  nongovernmental  organisations,  generally  tend  to  have  little  impact  on 
policy  formulation. Criticisms  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  EU’s  trade  policymaking 
process, which recently have become more pronounced (see Meunier 2005, Chapter 
7), should  therefore  be  directed  at  the  unequal  representation  of  concentrated  and 
diffuse interests rather than at the autonomy of state actors from economic interests.
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Table 1: EU negotiating position and sectoral demands in the Doha Development Agenda
EU position Supporters Opponents
Tariffs on non-agricultural 
products: far-reaching cuts, 
elimination of peaks, sectoral 
zero-tariff agreements
Chemicals;  food and drink industry; 
information and communication 
technologies; iron and steel industries; 
mechanical, electrical, electronic
and metalworking industries; non-ferrous 
metals; spirits
Lower tariff cuts for some 
products
Automobile manufacturers; textiles Retailers
Reduction of non-tariff barriers Automobile manufacturers; chemicals; 
information and communication 
technologies; mechanical, electrical, 




Mechanical, electrical, electronic and 
metalworking industries; services sector
Labour unions, development 
groups
Exception for audiovisual services Audiovisual services providers
Trade facilitation Chemicals; iron and steel industries; 
mechanical, electrical, electronic and 
metalworking industries; retailers
Multilateral investment rules Construction sector; electricity sector; 
iron and steel industries;  mechanical, 




Competition policy: transparency, 
non-discrimination
Construction sector
Public procurement Iron and steel industries
Strengthening of intellectual 
property rules
Mechanical, electrical, electronic




Protection of geographical 
indications
Agricultural sector; food and drink 
industry; spirits producers
Revision of antidumping rules 
(both offensive and defensive 
demands)
Iron and steel industries;  non-ferrous 
metals
Defend the Common Agricultural 
Policy
Agriculture Some industrial interests; 
some development groups
Cut agricultural subsidies Most industrial interests Agricultural sector; food 
and drink industry
(Nearly) tariff free treatment for 
least developed countries
Practically everybody
Reciprocity from “more 
advanced” developing countries
All economic interests Development groups
Clarification of relationship 
between WTO rules and 
multilateral environmental 
agreements
Environmental groups, most industrial 
sectors
Some environmental groups 
(not far-reaching enough)





Labour standards, but not linked 
to trade sanctions
Most industrial interests Some labour unions (would 
like to see trade sanctions)
Source: own compilation based on the position papers of 16 EU-level sectoral trade associations and some 
nongovernmental organisation.